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Abstract 
The paper presents a methodology which performs evalua- 
tion and construction of a sensor failure detection network for 
nuclear power plant signal validation. The network is ar- 
ranged in a fault tree structure which consists of sensors, 
mathematical models for sensor relations and decisionlestima- 
tors derived from parity relations. The evaluation scheme per- 
forms a logic state analysis to categorize critical signals and 
the associated sensors. The construction scheme cooperates 
with the evaluation scheme to build a detection network 
automatically using a rule-based algorithm. The package is 
implemented on a microdomputer and is demonstrated for the 
nuclear steam supply system of a PWR plant. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Erroneous and conflicting sensor readings often confuse 
human operators, degrade the performance of control systems, 
and may lead to actions that compromise the safety of nuclear 
power plants. The installation of redundant sensors for safety 
related parameters is a standard instrumentation practice; 
assessing measurement validity of enormous sensors by human 
operator is, however, tedious and its effectiveness is heavily 
dependent on operator's training and attention level. 
Therefore, there is a need to utilize modem computer-aided 
techniques to automate the validation process. 
One of the computer-aided signal validation approaches is 
to construct a fault detection network in which sensors and 
system dynamic models are linked in a tree structure and 
processed via analytic redundancy and parity relations. Based 
on this approach, Meijer et al. developed an on-line plant sig- 
nal validation system for steam generator instruments of a 
pressurized water reactor (PWR).[l] Kujawski et al. further 
incorporated the technique with heuristic rules and reliability 
analysis for diagnosis of vessel level instruments of a boiling 
water reactor (BWR).[2] Benedict et al. employed similar 
techniques to validate signals that are related to critical safety 
functions for the safety parameter display system (SPDS) of 
a PWR as well as a BWR.[3,4] 
In case that plant-wide signal validation of a complex 
system such as nuclear power plant is desired, the structure of 
a fault detection network generally contains many nodes and 
multiple goals which are coupled through common leaves. 
Even with a given set of sensors and dynamic models, one 
may have different arrangements and obviously would reach 
networks with different degrees of fault detection ability. 
Previous investigators, however, did not address this problem 
nor provide general construction rules and design assessment 
procedures. It was the intention of the present work to 
develop a scheme which would assess the fault detection 
ability of a network so that a designer can apply the evaluation 
result to improve the network structure by implementing extra 
sensors and/or analytically redundant relations for a better 
performance. At the same time, we may apply the knowledge 
obtained from the evaluation process to establish guideline for 
constructing a network in a systematic manner. 
To deal with the difficulties possibly encountered in 
storage and manipulation of a large amount of data, we 
adopted the entity relationship (ER) modeling technique[S] for 
data structuring and employed the object-oriented progrqm- 
ming technique[6] for data manipulation. Sections I1 and 111 
of the paper describe the evaluation and the construction 
schemes respectively. For demonstration, we implemented the 
methodology in a microcomputer and applied to the Taipower 
Company's Maanshan nuclear power plant. Section IV pres- 
ents the design procedure and result. 
11. EVALUATION SCHEME 
In a fault detection tree, sensors are c o ~ e c t e d  to a deci- 
sion/estimator (DIE) or an analytic model. The function of a 
D/E is to discriminate minority sensors and isolate their 
readings. The function of a model is to provide an analytical 
redundancy. Under the assumptions that the output of a D/E 
is correct and the model is best estimated with negligible 
error, the DIE and the analytic model may be treated as the 
logic OR and AND gate respectively. Analyzing the status of 
sensors in a network is then analogous to a logic state analysis 
of an electric circuit. We categorize sensors, including 
analytical sensors, into four classes according to whether the 
status of a sensor can be determined in a given tree structure: 
class 1 -- the sensor status can be determined; 
class 2 -- the sensor status can be determined conditionally; 
class 3 -- the sensor status can be determined only when 
class 4 -- the sensor status can not be determined. 
the sensor is normal; 
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The value obtained from the majority of sensors associated 
with a D/E unit is assumed to be a validated signal and is 
assigned as a class 0 sensor. 
To facilitate data manipulation, we defined two types of 
objects: one is the sensor object which can be a physical 
sensor or an analytic reading derived from a model; the other 
is the operator object which can be a DIE or a model. The 
entity relationship of the sensor and the operator is illustrated 
in Fig. 1. The attributes that describe the properties of the 
object are listed in Table I. 
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Fig. 1 Entity relations for sensor and operator objects 
Table I 
Attributes for sensor and operator objects 
Objeas I Attributes I Contents 
Destination 
Kind 
Input 
output 
Sensor name 
Class number 
Hardware sensor, D/E or model output 
Number of redundant sensor8 
Conuected to D/E or model 
Operator name 
sequence number 
D/E or model unit 
Input 9eDsor name 
Output sensor name 
Number of input  sensor^ 
Flag for processed or not 
Class assignment for each sensor is performed using a 
rule-based algorithm. Fourteen rules are developed; two rules 
are associated with the D/E operator and nine rules are associ- 
ated with the model operator. The remaining two rules are 
used to resolve conflict conditions. The evaluation process 
starts from the D/E units one at a time and followed by model 
units until the class of all sensors are uniquely determined. 
The evaluation scheme may be operated interactively with the 
construction scheme or independently to assess the capability 
of a given tree structure in detection and isolation of faulty 
signals. 
111. CONSTRUCTION SCHEME 
The construction scheme is to build a fault detection tree 
according to a given set of sensors and involved components. 
To construct a detection network, one has to define the critical 
s b a l s  to be validated and locate the corresponding sensors 
and physical components. In case of faults, the structure 
should detect the faulty sensor and to provide a bestestimated 
value for the critical signal. In other words, the selected 
critical signals and sensors should belong to class 0 and 1 
respectively according to the classification mentioned in Sec. 
11. To meet the goal, we have developed rules accorditlg to 
the characteristics of OR/AND logic gates and the experience 
learned from the evaluation process. For example, three or 
more redundant sensors should be connected to a D/E unit, at 
first; the input signals of a model unit should use the output of 
a D/E unit. If a signal is measured with only two sensors and 
is an input of a model unit, we would prefer a double-model 
structure as shown in Fig. 2a instead of the arrangement of 
Fig. 2b. Sensor c l  in the Fig. 2a arrangement can be checked 
by two redundant analytical readings and thus can be validated 
under the single failure criterion. Once the reading of c l  can 
be validated and if sensor b l  is normal, we would be able to 
tell whether sensor a1 or a2 has a failure. In the arrangement 
of Fig. 2b, sensors a l ,  a2 and c l  are all checked with only 
one extra redundant reading and thus their status can not be 
determined even under the single fault condition. Therefore, 
according to the mentioned sensor classifications, all sensors 
in Fig. 2b belong to class 3 while sensor cl  is upgraded to 
class 1 and sensors a1 and a2 is upgraded to class 2 in the 
arrangement shown in Fig. 2a. The example also clearly 
demonstrates that proper arrangements of a given set of 
sensors and models can improve fault detection ability. 
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Fig.2 (a) A double-model structure; (b) An alternative 
structure with the same set of objects. D E  and 
M stand for a decision/estimator and a model. 
During construction, sensor objects are arranged sequen- 
tially in a link-list form; processed sensors are deleted from 
the list and new sensors obtained from model outputs are 
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added. The scheme is terminated until the list is empty and a 
final evaluation is performed. If the evaluation result indicates 
that the class number of a critical signal or a sensor is not 
satisfactory, the designer either has to add extra sensors 
and/or model units to generate more redundancies. Currently, 
selections of critical signals, their corresponding sensors, and 
the input-output parameters of a component model are deci- 
sions of the designer. Figure 3 illustrates the flow chart of the 
construction process. The scheme may be expanded into an 
expert system by including an engineering knowledge base to 
make suggestions for sensor and model selections. Drawing 
of the tree structure is performed manually according to a list 
printed fiom the construction scheme. The art work may be 
performed automatically by interfacing the output data file to 
a graphics package for convenience. Despite the possible 
improvements, the present scheme can already assist the 
designer to evaluate and construct a network systematically 
and consistently. Furthermore, the data structure and the 
algorithms have the flexibility for different applications and 
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Fig. 3 Flow chart of the construction process 
IV. APPLICATION TO PWR SYSTEM 
steam Flow Rate 
Feedwater Flow Rate 
The design and validation modules are coded in C lab- 
guage and implemented in a 32-bit personal computer without 
special hardware requirements. For demonstration, we 
applied the schemes to the Taipower Company’s Maanshan 
power plant which is a typical three-loop PWR. Based on the 
ET474 329 
FT475 530 
FT476 s31 
. Fr4i7 s32 
plant’s requirement and the previous investigation of the 
EPRI’s report[3], nine safety related parameters in the reactor 
coolant system (RCS) and the steam generator and feedwater 
system are selected. According to the Piping and Instrument 
(P & ID) diagram of the Maanshan plant, there are 37 associ- 
ated sensors per loop as listed in Table 11. 
The steam flow rate and the feedwater flow rate m mea- 
sured with only two sensors respectively and require at least 
one more sensor to be a class 0 signal. The characteristics of 
the steam and feedwater flow control valves may be used to 
generate an analytical redundancy, which involves the valve 
position and the pressure drop across the valve. An alterna- 
tive for calculating the steam flow rate signal is to use a steam 
generator model which requires the energy input from the 
reactor coolant loop and feedwater as well as the inventory 
and the pressure of the steam generator. According to the P 
& ID diagram, there are five sensors available for feedwater 
temperature measurements and thus is a valid input signal for 
the model. Except for the feedwater flow rate, other input 
parameters of the steam generator model are measured with at 
least three or more sensors and are also class 0 signals. The 
feedwater flow rate is a selected safety parameter and needs 
to be validated anyway; therefore, the use of a steam genera- 
tor model to generate a redundant steam flow rate reading 
causes little extra design effort. 
Table 11 
Critical signals to be validated and the associated sensors 
Neutron Power N41 SI 
s2 
s4 
RCS Hot Leg Temperature TE421B s5 
TE422A s6 
TE422B S7 
RCS Cold Leg Temperature TE42IC s10 
TE422D s11 
s12 I 1 S13 
Prermrizapressure PT455 S14 
PT456 SI5 
PT457 Sl6 
Steam Generator Pmsure PT474 S26 
528 
The generation of the analytical redundancy for feedwater 
flow rate is more involved. The major components in a 
feedwater system include a feedwater control valve, feedwater 
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Fig. 4 Sensor fault detection tree for the Maanshan nuclear steam supply system; the sensor sequence number is 
given in Tables 11 and 111. Symbols SG, FV, FP, HR stand for models of steam generator, feedwater flow 
control valve, feedwater pump, and feedwater heater respectively. 
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heaters, and a feedwater pump. According to the feedwater 
flow path, a feedwater pump model is used to generate a flow 
rate signal for a heater model which in tum provides an inlet 
pressure signal to the flow control valve model. The valve 
model then generates a feedwater flow rate signal to fulfill the 
required redundancy. Table I11 lists the sensors related to the 
generation of the analytical feedwater flow rate signal. 
TE38 s33 
TEM) s34 
TE66 s35 
TE72 S36 
TE46 S37 
Table I11 
Sensors for the generation of analytical feedwater flow rate 
I Fmiwater Pump Inlet S42 
Feedwater Pump Outlet PT31 s44 
s45 1 5;: I s46 PrrSnre 
s(7 
Iterations between construction and evaluation process lead 
to a design shown in Fig. 4. Thirteen D/E units are used and 
are numbered according to the design sequence. As shown in 
Fig. 4, extra redundant readings are provided analytically for 
the steam flow rate as well as the feedwater flow rate to 
provide triple redundancies so that all nine critical signals can 
be validated. A double-model structure is also used for the 
feedwater pump inlet pressure sensors s42 and s43 to form a 
triple-redundancy for the feedwater pump flow sensor s41. 
The single feedwater flow control valve position sensor s38 is 
related to the two feedwater flow rate sensors s31 and is also 
a triple-redundancy structure. Therefore, evaluation results 
indicate that all 47 sensors are class 1 sensors despite some of 
the sensors have limited redundancies. 
v. SUMMARY 
We present in this paper a method for evaluating and 
constructing a sensors fault detection network. The develop- 
ment provides a tool to build the network in a systematic 
v e r  and to provide a quantitative measure for revealing 
design deficiencies. Data are structured using entity rela- 
tionships and manipulated using the object-oriented approach. 
The development is implemented into a personal computer and 
applied to a PWR plant for validation of safety related signals. 
Although the present work is a prototype design, the data 
structure is adaptable to different systems and the rule based 
algorithm can be expanded easily for future improvements. 
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